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Afterword 
Mistrust af ter Truth?
Thomas Yarrow
Strangely overlooked as an object of ethnographic enquiry, mistrust comes into 
rich empirical focus through this timely and compelling collection. It does so 
through the move to bracket the analytic questions: of what it is and whether 
this is good. Mühlfried is surely right to insist, as he does in his incisive intro-
ductory essay, that the lacunae is in part an artefact of the functionalist logic 
of mainstream social theory, specifically a persistent interest in trust as an ele-
ment of social cohesion. Once these commitments are suspended we see that, 
as in the cases of ‘ignorance’ (Mair et al. 2012) and ‘detachment’ (Candea et al. 
2015), the existence of mistrust is not just an incidental absence or negation but 
a specific kind of thing – a practice, an orientation, a form of personhood – that 
has qualities and substance of its own. A central insight from these essays is 
that this may be productive, literally in the sense it constitutes social practices 
and relationships, and more profoundly in the various ways that people may 
actively value and cultivate mistrust as a positive virtue. Mistrust is not an-
ti-social in any straightforward sense. Its absence may be incidental (dis-trust 
in Schiocchet’s terms) but is often a more active kind of presence. Beyond the 
vivid details of the cases the collection of these makes clear how mistrust is 
shot through with the multiplicity of its locations and so de-stabilizes what we 
might think we know about it. Mistrust develops through multiple contexts 
and concerns as ethical and ideological sensitivities, orientations performed 
through people, material contexts, domestic spaces and institutional cultures 
of various kinds. Like the phenomenon of mistrust itself, the book achieves 
its overall effect through holding these phenomena together, while remaining 
sceptical of the possibility of aggregation. I want to tease out two strands from 
this complexity, before trying to articulate how these might help us to think 
about the current moment in which the book takes shape – where discourses 
about ‘post truth’, have been contexts for novel forms of mis-trust.
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DeMarCation
According to Mühlfried, mistrust is a way of relating to the world in a distanced 
manner. It is not, he suggests, that interactions are avoided but, in his striking 
phrase, ‘never entered at full stake’ (Introduction: 8). To mistrust is to demar-
cate what can be trusted from what cannot. The contributors here have demon-
strated that there is no straightforward or singular way in which this happens. 
As an orientation that may be primarily epistemic, social, or indissolubly both, 
efforts to distinguish trust from mistrust act to define communities in a range 
of ways.
In Mühlfried’s comparative discussion, profound mistrust of mainstream 
social norms becomes a foundational act of community-making. Through 
renunciation of the social structures into which they were born, members of 
Russian gangs create a radical and profound break between the society they 
reject and the community of ‘thieves in law’ into which they enter. Notwith-
standing some profoundly different orientations, Jihadists likewise strive for 
hermetic demarcation that emerges on the basis of an absolute rejection of pre-
vailing social norms. In both cases mistrust directed beyond a community has 
its counterpart in strong trust amongst a community of believers. By contrast 
the forms of social demarcation at stake for inhabitants of Russian apartment 
blocks described by Utekhin are far less absolute. Ongoing suspicion and mis-
trust emerge here as more or less pronounced elements of most if not all inter-
actions, directed towards a set of relationships in which people are intimately 
enmeshed. In close proximity to familiar and familial relations, suspicion is 
deeply engrained. People withhold aspects of themselves as ‘the other side’ to 
relations of intimate domesticity and a ‘quasi-familial lack of distance’. Like-
wise, in the otherwise distinctive context of Sierra Leone, Bürge discusses how 
trust and mistrust articulate in a never fully resolved form. In a situation where 
trust is understood to be missing, people are concerned to fabricate it: trust 
(locally rendered ‘tros’) links people, objects and practices, in networks that are 
constantly made and un-made, through the situated demarcation of mistrust. 
In both these cases a sharp but un-resolved relation between trust and mistrust 
has its counterpart in suspicions directed towards communities in which peo-
ple continue to engage, and in social boundaries that are situationally specified, 
unresolved and always in question.
These acts of demarcation involve complex configurations of engagement 
and detachment. Mistrust involves a scepticism that can be a way of holding 
elements of the world – people or things – at a distance. This distancing, as 
Brand observes of domestic abuse counsellors in South Africa, can itself be a 
form of engagement – a way of understanding and interacting with the sub-
jects or objects thereby distanced. Mistrust can be foundational to productive 
relationships of distance, including through critique, objectification and epis-
Af ter word: Mistrust af ter Truth? 221
temic scepticism. From another perspective, mistrust enacts a distance from 
some things that is the very condition through which proximity to others is es-
tablished. Close communities are imagined and made through the distancing 
mistrust from other social worlds. 
trutH
Mistrust entails a sceptical orientation to truth, associated with more and less 
profound questioning. Proximate uncertainties and challenges to authoritative 
knowledge are not new and may ultimately assume and re-inscribe a faith in 
‘the truth’ to which these refer. In the context of South Africa, Brand shows 
how counsellors’ generalized mistrust of clients is ultimately founded on the 
epistemic practices of counselling. Conviction (trust) in their own ability to 
ascertain an objective truth orients mistrust externally – to the subjects whose 
circumstances they seek to understand. In the socio-legal practices explored by 
Bognitz in Rwanda, mistrust is central to the negotiations that surround the 
settlement of disputes. Mediators fabricate trust against this background of 
suspicion, drawing on evidence to establish how things ‘really are’. Objective 
truth is grounded in the subjectivity of the ‘true’ self of the mediator: qualities 
performed in practice through being humble, having humility and listening 
attentively. 
Novel contexts may pose challenges to the truths of experts without nec-
essarily undermining these. Indeed for the crypto-advocates studied by Ruh, 
‘generalized’ and fundamental mistrust in the security of Internet transactions 
not only directs attention to the truths of mathematics but also ultimately am-
plifies trust in their professional-cum-epistemic practices. Moreover, even as 
the internet is associated with a novel explicitness and awareness about the fal-
libility of human interactions, crypto-advocates’ doubts have their counterpart 
in a continued faith in the possibility and desirability of a return to what, as they 
see it, has been lost: an ultimate trust in notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘integri-
ty’ of interaction. For those involved in online dating scams, Beek highlights 
how online environments are associated with a similar mistrust but involve a 
fundamentally different epistemic orientation. Here the truths in question are 
not those of experts but of the romantic appeal of ‘genuine love’ and the ideas 
of ‘credibility’ that support these. These older romantic tropes remain central, 
even as the medium leads to profound mistrust of the message. In both cases, 
truth and trust become newly explicit concerns in digital environments asso-
ciated with anxieties about the threat to these valued ideals. Mistrust is novel, 
insofar as a truth that was given is now in doubt. 
By contrast, the examples of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Russia, remind 
us that in many parts of the world, there is nothing new about the kinds of 
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mistrust that relate to profoundly doubtful orientations to truth, and so to cir-
cumstances in which trust was never a given. In Russian apartment blocks a 
post-socialist ‘logic of suspicion’ has its roots, according to Utekhin, in a Soviet 
mentality where mistrust was systematic and practices of un-masking were 
second-nature. In Guinea, Somparé and Botta Somparé trace how the Ebola 
epidemic re-animates an already systemic mistrust in foreign organisations 
and elites and so in the medical knowledge that was central to their response. 
The chapter thus makes evident how social and epistemic trusts are intimately 
related in this post-colonial context.
af ter trust?
We are living through a time that many would characterize as a crisis of trust. 
The trust in question is that once reserved for ‘experts’, and the questioning 
involves a form of mistrust that comes in many forms. Over the last three de-
cades, political movements, social activists, media commentators and politi-
cians on both the left and right have sought to undermine the veracity of expert 
authority, alleging a series of vested interests. Accusations of expert fallibility 
emerge through a range of left-wing discourses, including the anti-globalisation 
movement’s challenge to the economic orthodoxy of ‘development’ (Williams 
2008) and participatory challenges to the elitist knowledge of experts (Cooke 
and Kothari 2001). Right-wing discourses more commonly attack experts as 
representing of the bureaucratic antithesis of ‘the market’, where the latter is 
positioned as the ultimate arbiter of value (DuGay 2000). Allegations of expert 
elitism gain particular traction in contexts where class divides and inequalities 
have been sharpened through post-industrial decline and decades of neoliberal 
reform (Green 2016). Commentators have connected the post-modern relativ-
ization of ‘truth’ to digital media technologies, through which perspective pro-
liferates and knowledge is reduced to information (Agar 2003; Tsoukas 1997). 
‘Post truth’ is also ‘post-trust’, at least in the kinds of knowledge and institu-
tions that were once considered the bedrock of liberal democracy. 
Anthropologically speaking, ‘post-truth’ is a significant phenomenon, if not 
one that has yet received much ethnographic attention. It is a set of discourses 
that constitute a newfound explicitness about the limits of experts, and a broad 
mistrust in the truths for which they were once, at least in much of Europe 
and America, un-questioned arbiters. Whereas experts were always subject 
to contingent mistrust, this was rarely systemic in Euro-American contexts. 
What is new is that they are increasingly in the position of having to fabricate 
knowledge, authority and trust in contexts where it cannot be assumed. At this 
juncture many of the things that anchored trust, including ideas about scien-
tific truth, authenticity and integrity remain relevant even as they are newly in 
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question, mistrusted and challenged from various sides, including through the 
auto-critiques of experts themselves. Public doubt and scepticism is connected 
to the explication of what could once be implicit: in multiple ways including 
academic and other forms of audit (Furedi 2004; Strathern 2000), science that 
is oriented to social utility (Nowotny 2003), the authority of expert knowledge is 
reconfigured and re-distributed if not necessarily undermined through entan-
glements with a range of ‘social’ and ‘public’ external audiences. 
While few of the contributors to this volume are explicitly concerned with 
the challenges of ‘post truth’ sociality, they help to locate these recent discours-
es, and to question some of the more general assumptions that inform these. 
They do this by bringing into focus the myriad ways in which truth, trust and 
mistrust are entangled, by pointing to the multiple forms these take, and the 
specific historical and cultural trajectories through which these arise. We may 
still want to insist that things have changed, that mistrust is being re-animated 
in ways that are far reaching and profound, but the careful foregoing descrip-
tions help explain the terrain on which these myriad configurations are now 
taking shape. At this juncture the collection reminds us to remain mis-trustful 
of grand-narratives and singular diagnoses of social change, including of the 
reduction of these changes to a meta-phenomena for which one may be ‘for’ or 
against.
And so I want to return to where the introduction to this volume ended, 
via a plea for ethnography as a method of being ambivalent in relation to the 
question of who and what is trusted. When anthropologists ‘come home’, par-
ticularly to focus on experts and expertise, the prevailing mode of engagement 
has been via a hermeneutics of suspicion that echoes and amplifies some of the 
populist tendencies (from right and left), particularly in the claim or assump-
tion that trust in these people and their knowledge is misplaced. Foucauldian 
inspired deconstructions have sought to make apparent a misplaced trust in 
experts. That served as an important corrective, but has tended to result in 
‘thin’ ethnography that does little to illuminate the ethnographic substance of 
what is involved – ideologically, ethically, epistemologically, personally and so 
on (Boyer 2008; Brown et al. 2017). Methodologically speaking, it might be use-
ful to suspend mistrust for longer, in order to produce a more ethnographically 
nuanced understanding of these practices.
If we want to better understand the current, or indeed any, moment it seems 
important to approach the mistrustful sentiments of ‘angry citizens’, along 
with the scientific and expert purveyors of ‘objective evidence’ in the same way: 
through understanding and critique, derived from empirical enquiry into the 
specific conditions in which others live their lives, through relationships found-
ed on a dialectic of trust and mistrust that is never fully resolved.
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